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FOOD SAFETY REGULATIONS - CROSS-BORDER
IMPLICATIONS - A U.S. PERSPECTIVE
Matthew Schaefer
The United States and Canada are largely in agreement on food safety
regulation issues. So, let me set up the debate between several parties not in
the room. The debate at the time the Sanitary & Phytosanitary (SPS) Agree-
ment was concluded was between the Office of the United States Trade Rep-
resentative (USTR) and some consumer advocates, like Ralph Nader, and ex-
presidential candidates, like Pat Buchanan. The claim by the USTR was that
the SPS Agreement would allow an increase in trade by eliminating protec-
tionist barriers under the guise of food safety standards while still allowing
the United States to maintain its own high food safety standards, and, in fact,
even increase those food safety standards, if they chose a higher level of
protection than was being achieved by existing standards. The Bu-
chanan/Nader claim was that, regardless of what would happen with trade
under the SPS Agreement, U.S. food safety standards would be threatened or
diminished and that we would have to follow the standards of international
bodies such as the Codex Alimentarius.'
I want to turn to the Honnones case2 to settle this debate, or at least give
some initial guidance on it, as the agreement has operated in practice. But I
thought first I would put the Hormones case and SPS Agreement in the
broader context of U.S. trade interests in agricultural and food products and
U.S. food regulation more generally.
SPS measures are increasing in importance and visibility. If you pick up a
newspaper, you may read about the United States and the European Union
negotiating an agreement for mutual recognition in trade in animal products.
You may have also read about a recent proposal to ban imports of animal
* Matthew Schaefer is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska
College of Law. He holds a B.A. from the University of Chicago, and a J.D. and LL.M. from
the University of Michigan. Statistics and information regarding the U.S. food safety system in
this Article are taken largely from an excellent article by Michael R. Taylor. See Michael R.
Taylor, Responsible For What When It Comes to Meeting the Food Safety Challenges of the
Consumer-Driven Global Economy?, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 13 (1997).
1 Codex Alimentarius is a joint undertaking of two U.N. bodies. It is explicitly referred to
in the text of the SPS Agreement as the primary international standard-setting body for food
safety. See <http'//www.tasinc.com/tas-code.html> (visited on July 7, 1998).
See E.C. - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26IAB/
R (Jan. 16, 1998).
24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 377 (1998). Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
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products into the E.U. that contained specified risk materials (SRMs) which
may contain Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), also known as
"Mad Cow Disease." SRMs include animal parts such as skulls, brains, eyes,
tonsils, pituitary glands, and spinal columns. Of course, even in my home
state of Nebraska, SPS issues receive attention quite frequently after an E.
coli 0157:H7 scare at a Nebraska meat plant.' South Korea kept a ship with
Nebraska meat off-shore. They would not even agree to inspect the meat for
E. coli. In addition, Nebraska wheat shipments going through the Pacific
Northwest had problems entering China because China feared that our wheat
that was transported through that part of our country had TCK Smut. TCK
Smut has no effect on human health, and China's measure would not survive
scrutiny under the SPS Agreement. But, of course, China is not yet a WTO
Member.
Let me turn to the importance of the production, processing, marketing,
and trade of food and agricultural products to the U.S. standard of living and
the economic health of the United States. There are ten million employees in
the agricultural sector. We have five hundred billion dollars in GDP added to
the U.S. economy by the sector. We have exports worth sixty billion dollars,
and, of course, those are growing. There are more mouths to feed overseas
than there are in the United States. And, of course, we cannot feed those
mouths if there are hidden barriers under the guise of food safety regulation.
Next, let's take a look at the broader context of food safety regulation in
the United States. Vice President Al Gore's national performance review
called for a consolidation of food safety issues into a single agency. That is
not going to happen for political reasons. As a result, primary jurisdiction
over food safety issues remains split between the Food and Drug Admini-
stration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The USDA
handles poultry and meat, and the FDA handles most of the rest. The FDA
has responsibility for over 53,000 establishments. They have 250 full-time
inspectors and inspect about 5,000 establishments annually. So, FDA inspec-
tions are somewhat infrequent. The USDA has responsibility for over 6,200
plants, has 7,300 full-time inspectors, and their inspections are being con-
ducted on a daily basis.
The USDA inspectors actually view the carcasses as they go through the
plants. Visual inspection can determine whether a carcass is diseased, but it
certainly cannot spot microbial pathogens like E. coli 0157:H7. There are
other federal agencies involved, most importantly, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, which sets pesticide residue levels. State and local govern-
ments have primary jurisdiction over inspecting restaurants. Of course, we as
3 See Michael Janofsky, 25 Million Pounds of Beef is Recalled, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 22,
1997, at A6.
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consumers all have roles to play in protecting our health with respect to our
food, not as regulators, but in the new mode of thinking, farm to table, we
need to properly store our food in refrigerators, wash our hands and utensils,
and properly cook our food.
Reforms are underway. For instance, the Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Point System (HACCP) is being implemented. Basically, it requires
plants and slaughter houses to have certain procedures and record-keeping
processes in place that will allow the limited enforcement resources to be
better utilized. For instance, when the FDA comes in on one of its inspec-
tions, they will not just get a snapshot of a plant. Instead, the record keeping
with respect to the procedures followed by the plant will give them a much
broader view of what is going on in the plant. The system will also assist
plants in reducing some of the pathogens that cannot be seen during a visual
inspection.
With regard to imports, the FDA inspects only one to two percent of im-
port shipments and conducts relatively few overseas inspections of food
processing plants. The USDA inspects five to ten percent of import ship-
ments and has a much more elaborate system of equivalence inspections
overseas. The United States is moving toward requiring the HACCP System
to be established overseas in order to gain access to the U.S. markets. This is
good because you simply cannot inspect every shipment that comes into the
United States, no matter how great the resources become.
What I hope this overview has led you to believe, even before I have
moved to the Hormones case and the SPS Agreement, is that the lack of in-
spections and resources, and the pace at which reforms are implemented, are
a much greater threat to U.S. food safety than the SPS Agreement. In fact, I
would argue the SPS Agreement is no threat at all to U.S. food safety.
So let us turn to the WTO Appellate Body report in the Hormones case.4 I
will not give a long history of the case. Europe, in response to some con-
sumer fears, banned the import of beef treated with hormones. They also
prohibited their own domestic producers from using hormones for growth
promotion purposes in their cattle. The import ban created a long-standing
trade dispute between the European Union and the United States. The United
States imposed retaliatory sanctions under Section 301 in the late 1980s.
Then, when the WTO Agreement entered into force, to show our confidence
in the system, we removed the unilateral sanctions and brought what has ul-
timately been a successful case against the Europeans.
I think the Appellate Body report shows that the USTR's claims about the
effects of the SPS Agreement are much more on target than the claims of
4 See supra note 2.
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Buchanan, Nader, and the like. In fact, if you look at the Appellate Body
report and their interpretation of various provisions of the Agreement, it
tracks very closely the explanations the USTR gave in what is called the
Statement of Administrative Action, which is a document that accompanies
the implementing bill and explains various provisions of the Uruguay Round
Agreements.
Article 3, Paragraph 1, of the SPS Agreement which intended to harmo-
nize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible, says,
"Members shall base sanitary and phytosanitary measures on international
standards where they exist, except as otherwise provided for in this Agree-
ment."5 Well, the third paragraph of Article 3 gives a case where it is other-
wise provided. You do not have to use international standards where there is
a scientific justification for not relying on them, i.e., science has shown that
international standards will not achieve your level of protection, or you have
simply chosen a higher level of protection. The language is somewhat redun-
dant in this regard, but a footnote was added to make clear that you did not
need to follow international standards where you had chosen a higher level of
protection, and where science showed that the international standards would
not meet your level of protection.
The Nader/Buchanan claim is that the United States is going to have to
follow standards of the Codex Alimentarius, to which 151 nations are a
party. It was created in 1962 as a joint undertaking of two U.N. bodies, the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO). However, it is clear from the Hormones Appellate Body report
that you do not need to follow international standards such as those promul-
gated by the Codex Alementarius where you have chosen a higher level of
protection.
But who bears the burden of proof in a challenge under the SPS Agree-
ment? The original dispute settlement panel (hereinafter "Panel") claimed
that Paragraph 3 was an exception to the general rule in Paragraph 1 that you
should follow international standards. The Appellate Body said, no, Para-
graph 3 is not an exception. It found that following Paragraph 1 or 3 were
equal alternatives. Under the Panel's reasoning, the challenger would only
have to show that there was an international standard and that the challenged
measure was not based on the standard in order to establish a prima facie
case. The Appellate Body said, you, as challenger, do have to make a prima
facie case, but it is not enough just to show that there is an international stan-
dard, and show that the measure at issue is not based on the standard. Instead,
5 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, art. 3.1
<http://www.wto.org.goods.spsagr.htm> (visited on June 28, 1998).
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the challenger must show that the measure does not have the scientific basis,
and it was not based on a risk assessment.
So the Appellate Body's analysis of the relationship between Articles 3.1,
3.3, and 3.2, which grants a presumption of legality to measures that conform
with an international standard, does not interfere with a nation's ability to
choose its own level of protection. In particular, there is no requirement to
use an international standard, and you are not damaged in terms of the bur-
den of proof by failing to rely on an international standard.
6Let us turn to Article 5.1. It obligates governments to base their SPS
measures on a risk assessment as appropriate to the circumstances. If you
choose a level of protection, such as one death per million persons, or a zero-
risk standard, all risk assessment tells you is how much of a certain product
you can tolerate without exceeding that level of risk, Choosing a level of
protection is a public policy choice; risk assessment gives you the scientific
justification for constraining a particular chemical or additive in a certain
level. The Appellate Body made clear that there was no minimum magnitude
of risk that needed to be shown in a risk assessment. Theoretical uncertainty
is not enough, but, of course, a precautionary principle is built into the
Agreement in Article 5.7, where, if there is insufficient scientific evidence,
you can preliminarily establish a standard and then go out and try to get the
science that would affirmatively support your measure.7
The language of the SPS Agreement stating that Members shall base their
SPS measures on a risk assessment only requires a rational relationship be-
tween the measure and the risk assessment. The Appellate Body took into
account that there will be scientific uncertainty. Indeed, I think it is clear
from the Appellate Body's report that a measure need not be supported by
science adopted by a majority within the field. But I think it is clear that sci-
ence advocacy in its worst form is not sufficient. Having a single scientist
that conducts a risk assessment which does not focus on the specifics, i.e., the
risk of hormones used for growth promotion purposes and the residues left in
the beef as a result, is not sufficient.
Nevertheless, I do think the Honnones case shows that the Appellate
Body is willing to give a great deal of deference to national governments on
this. In terms of the factors that can be taken into account in a risk assess-
ment, the Appellate Body made clear that it is not just the physical sciences.
A government does not have to look just at science in the laboratory. It can
look at risks in the real world as well. For instance, all the science has shown
that hormones for growth promotion purposes in beef is safe, provided it is
6 Id. at arL 5.1.
7 Id. at art. 5.7.
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done under good veterinary practice. The E.U. argued that they do not know
whether hormones are administered under good veterinary practice within the
United States. The Appellate Body said the E.U. was allowed to take that
into account. Are the U.S. and Canadian producers using good veterinary
practice when they administer these growth promotion hormones? One needs
to look to the actual problems and experiences in the United States and Can-
ada. In fact, the E.U., in response to the report, wants to go back and conduct
just such a risk assessment. I think that just goes to show you how much def-
erence the Appellate Body is giving to national food safety officials.
The last provision I want to look at is Article 5.5, which has the objective
of achieving consistency in the application of the concept of appropriate lev-
els of SPS protection. It states that, "each Member shall avoid arbitrary and
unjustifiable distinction in levels it considers to be appropriate in different
situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or disguise restriction
on international trade."8 Let me break that provision into three parts as did
the Appellate Body.
First, with regard to the objective of achieving consistency in levels of
protection, a committee is going to undertake further work on this, but the
Appellate Body noted that this is not a legal obligation. A government should
seek consistency, but, of course, different measures are enacted at different
times, and levels of protection may differ. There is no absolute obligation to
have levels of protection uniform with respect to all chemicals and all prod-
ucts. What you must avoid are arbitrary and unjustifiable distinctions, if such
distinctions result in discrimination or disguise restriction on international
trade.
What is arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination? Do we compare be-
tween products with similar pesticides, between similar pesticides on a par-
ticular product, or between different pesticides on different products? This is
not altogether clear. The Appellate Body notes that you only compare what is
comparable. There must be some similarity to make such a comparison and
then judge whether a distinction arising from that comparison is arbitrary or
unjustifiable. But the Appellate Body went on to overturn the Panel on sev-
eral comparisons in which the Panel found arbitrary or unjustifiable distinc-
tions.
The first was hormones occurring naturally in beef versus hormones in-
jected for growth promotion purposes. The E.U. makes a distinction between
these two levels of protection. The Appellate Body says that is not arbitrary.
To regulate naturally occurring hormones in beef would require massive
governmental intervention. Second, the E.U. makes the distinction between
8 Id. at art. 5.5.
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the levels of protection for therapeutic use of hormones and growth promo-
tion purposes. The Appellate Body says that distinction is not arbitrary or
unjustifiable. The therapeutic uses are on a small scale. They are rare, and
they are under the care of a veterinarian.
As to the distinction between Carbadox, an anti-microbial agent given to
swine so that they do not get intestinal disease, thus making them gain
weight more quickly, and the growth hormones used on beef, the Appellate
Body did find these comparable, and did find that there were arbitrary and
unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of protection between the two. But, in
fact, the E.U. had almost admitted as much because the E.U. directive regu-
lating the use of Carbadox is under review by the E.U. Commission. The
Appellate Body made clear with respect to this arbitrary and unjustifiable
distinction between Carbadox given to swine and hormones given to beef,
that it must result in discrimination or disguise restriction on trade, the third
part of Article 5.5's test.
Despite the fact that the U.S. and Canadian beef producers were the pri-
mary users of growth promotion hormones prior to the E.U. directive hnd
that there is a large difference in the residue levels allowed between Carba-
dox and hormones for growth promotion purposes, the Appellate Body found
that this was not a disguised restriction on international trade. Again, it
showed great deference to national authorities.
I think it is clear from this brief review of the Hormones case that the
USTR's version of the Agreement's impact on food safety is correct. This is
only the first WTO dispute settlement case concerning the SPS Agreement.
There is another one coming out on salmon soon that will give us additional
guidance, but I think the claims of Buchanan and Nader ring hollow.
What should we conclude with respect to the SPS Agreement's impact on
U.S. sovereignty? Entering into the SPS Agreement was a wise exercise of
U.S. sovereignty. It is in the national interest of the United States. It does not
reduce our food safety program, and it enhances the significant interest in
U.S. agriculture and food trade. The Hormones case gives us the first initial
proof that the SPS Agreement is, in fact, not a threat at all to U.S. standards.
If there is a total breakdown in a future dispute settlement case involving
a U.S. food safety measure, such as if a Panel did something totally outra-
geous, the United States maintains the right to appeal to the Appellate Body,
and the right to maintain the measure should the Appellate Body fail to cor-
rect an egregious mistake of a panel. Panel and Appellate Body reports do
not change U.S. law or regulations; only the democratically elected Congress
can change U.S. law. There are built-in protections for sovereignty in our
constitutional structure in the way Congress implemented the Uruguay
Round Agreements. Furthermore, you have to look at the real politics of the
384 CANADA-UNITED STATESLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:377 1998
situation. The Appellate Body is going to be sensitive in this area. I think you
see it coming through in the Hormones case. They are not likely to run
astray.
Since everybody knows state and local governments are my favorite
topic, I will conclude with a little footnote with respect to them. There is no
doubt that state and local governments can continue to set their own levels of
protection. The SPS Agreement does not require states to harmonize their
standards or adopt federal levels of protection. Of course, other federal laws
may pre-empt the states in this regard. I repeat, there is nothing in the SPS
Agreement that pre-empts states from choosing different levels of protection.
Lastly, it is clear that a state can continue to set levels of protection via refer-
endum rather than through state regulation or state law. This was a major
concern for states and localities as the SPS Agreement was being negotiated
and yet another area in which the claims of Buchanan and Nader ring hollow.
